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Abstract
We consider a revenue optimizing seller selling a single item to a buyer, on whose private
value the seller has a noisy signal. We show that, when the signal is kept private, arbitrarily
more revenue could potentially be extracted than if the signal is leaked or revealed. We then
show that, if the seller is not allowed to make payments to the buyer, the gap between the two is
bounded by a multiplicative factor of 3 when the value distribution conditioning on each signal
is regular. We give examples showing that both conditions are necessary for a constant bound
to hold.
We connect this scenario to multi-bidder single-item auctions where bidders’ values are cor-
related. Similarly to the setting above, we show that the revenue of a Bayesian incentive com-
patible, ex post individually rational auction can be arbitrarily larger than that of a dominant
strategy incentive compatible auction, whereas the two are no more than a factor of 5 apart if
the auctioneer never pays the bidders and if each bidder’s value conditioning on the others’ is
drawn according to a regular distribution. The upper bounds in both settings degrade gracefully
when the distribution is a mixture of a small number of regular distributions.
The authors would like to thank Shuchi Chawla and Anna Karlin for helpful discussions during the early stage
of this work.
1 Introduction
Revenue maximization when selling a single item to a single buyer is a fundamental and well-
understood problem in mechanism design. In the classical model, the buyer holds a private value v
for the item, and the seller only knows the distribution D from which v is drawn. The revenue-
maximizing strategy of the seller is to offer the buyer an optimal take-it-or-leave-it price. This
simple fact is one of the earliest insights offered by the revenue optimization literature [12, 14],
and also one of the key building blocks of many recent approximation results in more complicated
scenarios [e.g. 4, 1].
Implicit in this classical model is a simple information structure: the buyer is completely in-
formed, and the seller only partially so. As a consequence, when taking a price, the buyer usually
derives a positive utility knows as the information rent due to this information asymmetry. In
modern online markets, however, there is often information asymmetry in the other direction as
well. Even if the buyer always knows fully her value (which may or may not be the case in practice),
the seller may still possess partial information of which the buyer cannot be sure. For example,
transactions in the near past with other buyers may suggest market trends which inform the seller
but are not precisely known to the buyer. The notorious obscurity of machine learning techonologies
also contribute to such asymmetry — whereas the seller may have more or less accurate estimates
on the buyer’s value based on various observable attributes, the buyer may not be able to determine
which attributes of hers are picked up as cues by the seller’s learning algorithm, and hence could
not determine what estimate the seller has. In these scenarios, the buyer is uncertain about the
information held by the seller, even though she is completely informed of her value, seemingly the
central information in the transaction.
This paper studies the implication of such information asymmetry on the seller’s revenue. The
basic question we raise is: Are there nontrivial ways for the seller to exploit this asymmetry so as
to increase his revenue? The answer, in short, is that sophisticated exploitation is possible and in
some cases could drive up the revenue unboundedly compared with “na¨ıve” uses of this information
asymmetry; however, under a few conditions that seem naturally satisfied in practical scenarios,
the benefit of such sophistication is bounded by a small muliplicative constant factor. Below we
explain what we mean by “sophisticated” and “na¨ıve” pricings, after we lay down the basic model.
The Model. We model the simplest information asymmetry by having a value v and a signal s
drawn from a commonly known correlated distribution; the buyer only sees her value v for the item
and the seller only sees s. The seller aims to optimize his revenue, taking expectation over the joint
distribution.
Na¨ıve pricing: Upon observing s, the seller has a distribution over v conditioning on s. We say
the seller na¨ıvely uses the signal if he simply adopts the optimal strategy for each such conditional
distribution — as we saw above, this amounts to posting a take-it-or-leave-it price optimally for
each s. It is easy to see that this is also the best strategy of the seller if s is publicized or leaked.
In an e-commerce scenario, this could be the case where the seller publicizes his learning algorithm
or whichever information gathered pertaining to the buyer.
It may come as a surprise that the na¨ıve pricing may not be optimal; after all, in a sense, it
optimizes the revenue pointwise. The suboptimality of this approach lies precisely in its failure to
exploit information asymmetry. Publicizing the signal reduces its worth to a mere sharper estimte
of the value distribution, and gives up its uncertainty, when kept private, in the buyer’s eyes. We
show in Section 3.1 that this uncertainty can be leveraged to elicit more information from the buyer
and hence increase the seller’s revenue, in some cases by an arbitrarily large multiplicative factor.
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Main result. Our upper bound on the worth of concealing the signal is the most technically-
sophisticated part of the paper. Under two conditions, we show that the optimal revenue with
private signal is no more than 3 times the revenue of optimal posted price under each (public) sig-
nal. The first condition asks that the seller never pay money to the buyer, which seems a natural
requirement in many scenarios. The second condition requires that each conditional distributions
of the value v is regular in Myerson [12]’s sense.1 Viewed alternatively, our bound suggests that a
seller looking to boost the value of private signals may consider making payments to the buyer oc-
cassionally or sharpening the signals in such a way that the resulting conditional value distributions
have interleaved supports (see Example 2 for an instance of this).
For the readers familiar with the revenue optimization literature, we remark that regularity of
value distributions usually does not mitigate the gaps between revenues of different mechanisms,
not least because the most common distribution used in showing such large gaps, the equal revenue
distribution, is itself regular. As we explain later, the regularity condition enters our analysis in a
non-standard way.
Regularity is often deemed a natural condition when the buyer can be identified as a certain
category of customer, whereas uncertainty on the category results in irregular distributions that is
a mixture of regular distributions [see, e.g., 16]. Our upper bound degrades gracefully for mixtures
of a small number of regular distributions.
Connection to multi-bidder auctions. We are not the first to observe that correlated external
information can be used to extract a buyer’s information rent. For multi-bidder auctions where
the bidders’ values are drawn from correlated distributions, classical works by Cre´mer and McLean
[5, 6] showed ways to extract from each bidder her full value by leveraging her competitors’ bids.
The similarity between the two settings is immediate when one takes the competitors’ bids as
private signals. However, Cre´mer and McLean’s results do not apply to us because we constrain
our seller’s mechanism much more stringently: crucial for Cre´mer and McLean’s mechanisms is
that the auctioneer may charge the buyer anything as long as the buyer, conditioning on any value
she holds, has nonnegative expected utility. This is known as interim individual rationality (IR).
In contrast, we insist on the more realistic ex post IR constraint, which stipulates that the buyer
should never have a negative utility no matter what signal is realized. This key difference is what
makes our examples of unbounded gaps nontrivial and our constant upper bound possible.
In multi-bidder auctions, the solution concept corresponding to na¨ıve pricing or pricing with
publicized signals is dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC), whereas the more sophis-
ticated selling with private signals corresponds to Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) auctions.
The second main contribution of this paper is the first study of the revenues of DSIC and BIC
single-item auctions, which complements several recent works that compare the revenues of DSIC
and BIC multi-item auctions [17, 18]. (Under the looser interim IR constraint, the revenue of DSIC
and BIC auctions was almost fully characterized by Cre´mer and McLean [5, 6].)
We show unbounded gaps between the revenues of DSIC and BIC auctions (under ex post in-
dividual rationality); with non-negative payments and regular distributions, we show that Ronen
[15]’s DSIC lookahead auction 5-approximates the optimal BIC revenue. The first part follows
immediately from the single-buyer examples, whereas the 5-approximation is technically more non-
trivial, as we discuss below.
Our techniques. The driving horse for our main result is the duality framework which was
recently promoted by Cai et al. [2] and subsequently applied to various settings [e.g. 11, 8, 7]. The
1Regularity is a standard notion in the literature of revenue optimization, to be precisely defined in Section 2.
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basic approach is to write the optimal revenue of a target mechanism (in our case, the revenue with
private signals, or the optimal BIC revenue) as the objective of a linear program and then Lagrangify
the IC and IR constraints; the value of the resulting Lagrangian with any dual variables serves as
an upper bound on the optimal revenue and can be used as a benchmark for approximation. What
is peculiar about the argument in this work is that, since the the signals’ uncertainty is key to
revenue maximization, the dual variables controlling the buyer’s incentives cannot be engineered
for each value distribution conditioned on a signal. That is, these dual variables cannot be functions
of the signals. On the other hand, standard dual variables giving rise to the public signal revenue
via Myerson’s virtual values are distribution dependent. In general, distribution-independent dual
variables do not produce quantities that can be bounded by the virtual values. We overcome this
difficulty by constructing dual variables which, besides the “virtual value terms”, generate another
term that grows in the worse case with the welfare. A fairly non-standard argument shows that
regularity brings this additional term down to comparable with na¨ıve pricing revenues (or DSIC
revenue in multi-bidder auctions).
Multi-bidder auctions pose another difficulty: the seller not only maximizes the revenue from
each bidder, but is also subject to the item’s availability: two bidders cannot be both assigned
the item. Revenue optimal auctions are already complicated even under the more stringent DSIC
constraint [e.g. 9, 13, 3]. One way to disentangle multiple bidders’ interaction is provided by Ronen
[15]’s DSIC lookahead auction, which maximizes its revenue from the highest bidders and gives up
lower bidders. Ronen showed that this 2-approximates the optimal DSIC revenue. However, the
natural extension of Ronen’s auction to the BIC auctions fails, due to a subtle reason we explain
briefly at the end of the paper (Section 5). Instead, we take the duality approach again, and appeal
to a property possessed by the particular dual variables we constructed for the single buyer case
(Claim 3 in Section 4). This allows us to bound the lower bidders’ contribution in the Langrangian
by twice the second price auction revenue, and the problem boils down to maximizing revenue from
the highest bidder, which is a single buyer problem, where we could apply our previous argument.
We note that bounding lower bidders’ contribution to revenue by the second highest value is the
essence of Ronen [15]’s original proof, and the idea that this can be done in the Langragian was
implicit in several duality-based works [e.g. 2, 10].
2 Preliminaries
Single-Buyer Pricing with Signals. A seller tries to sell a single item to a buyer, who has a
private type t, which indicates the buyer’s value of the item; throughout the paper we use types t
and values v interchangeably. The seller observes a private signal s ∈ S. The pair (t, s) is drawn
from a commonly known joing distribution D, whose density function we denote by f(·, ·). We also
write Fs(t) :=
∫
t′≤t f(t
′, s) dt′. A selling mechanism consists of an allocation rule x(v, s), indicating
the probability with which the buyer gets the item when she reports her value as v and the seller
sees signal s, and a payment rule p(v, s), the payment made by the buyer to the seller. We say
the mechanism has no negative payment if p is never negative, i.e., the seller never pays the buyer.
The expected revenue of a mechanism is E(v,s)∼D[p(v, s)].
In na¨ıve pricing, or pricing with publicized or leaked signals, the seller adopts, for each ob-
served s, a mechanism for the value distribution conditioned on s. Such a mechanism needs to
be (i) ex post individually rational (IR): for any v and s, vx(v, s) − p(v, s) ≥ 0, and (ii) incentive
compatible (IC): for any v, v′ and s, v · x(v, s)− p(v, s) ≥ v · x(v′, s)− p(v′, s).
Definition 1 (Virtual Values). Given a value distribution with density function f and cumulative
density function F , the Myerson virtual value is ϕ(v) := v − 1−F (v)
f(v) . Given a joint distribution D
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on (v, s), we denote by ϕs(v) the virtual value of v in the conditional distribution Fs given s.
Lemma 1 (Myerson1981). A mechanism is IC only if its allocation rule x is monotone non-
decreasing, and its expected revenue for a value distribution F (without signals) is the virtual
surplus
∫
v
ϕ(v)x(v) dF (v). The revenue-optimal mechanism for any F posts a take-it-or-leave-it
price.
Lemma 1 implies that with public signals, posting a price optimal for each signal s maximizes
the seller’s revenue.
For mechanisms with private signals, besides being (i) ex post IR, the IC constraint weakens
to: (ii’) for all v and v′, Es∼D(s|v)[v ·x(v, s)−p(v, s)] ≥ Es∼D(s|v)[v ·x(v
′, s)−p(v′, s)], where D(s|v)
denotes the conditional distribution of s given v. Equivalently, the constraint can be written as∫
s
(v · x(v, s)− p(v, s))f(v, s) ds ≥
∫
s
(v · x(v′, s)− p(v′, s))f(v, s) ds.
Definition 2 ((Jointly) Regular Distributions). A value distribution F (without signals) is regular
if its support is an interval [l, h] ⊂ R, and its virtual value ϕ is nondecreasing on [l, h]. A distribution
D on (v, s) is jointly regular if the conditional distribution of v given any signal s is regular.
Note that joint regularity does not require the conditional value distributions to be supported
on the same interval given different signals.
Single-item (Multi-bidder) Auctions In a single item auction, one indivisible good is to be
allocated to at most one of n bidders. Bidder i has a private type ti ∈ R, and the types are drawn
from a possibly correlated, commonly known joint distribution D. We write t = (t1, . . . , tn) to
denote the profile of types and t−i = (t1, . . . , ti−1, ti+1, . . . , tn). A mechanism (auction) is specified
by its allocation rules xi : t 7→ [0, 1] and payment rules pi : t 7→ R. The utility of bidder i is
ui(t) = ti · xi(t) − pi(t). The allocation rules are required to satisfy the feasbility constraint:∑
i xi(t) ≤ 1, for all t and i.
Similar to the IC constraint under public signals in single buyer pricing, a mechanism is domi-
nant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if for each bidder i, each type profile t, and any deviation
t′i,
ti · xi(t)− pi(t) ≥ ti · xi(t
′
i, t−i)− pi(t
′, t−i).
Similar to the IC constraint under private signals, an auction is Bayesian incentive compatible
(BIC) if for each bidder i with type ti and possible deviation t
′
i,
Et−i∼Dt−i|ti [ti · xi(t)− p(t)] ≥ Et−i∼Dt−i|ti
[
ti · xi(t
′
i, t−i)− p(t
′
i, t−i)
]
,
where Dt−i|ti denotes the distribution of t−i conditioned on bidder i’s type being ti. A mechanism
is ex-post individually rational (IR) if ti · xi(t)− pi(t) ≥ 0 for any type profile t and interim IR if
Et−i∼Dt−i | ti [ti · xi(t)− pi(t)] ≥ 0.
Myerson [12]’s seminal paper showed that, for a product distribution D, a DSIC, ex post IR
auction maximizes revenue among all BIC, interim IR auction. In sharp contrast, for correlated
distributions, Cre´mer and McLean [5, 6] showed that, except for degenerate cases, interim IR
auctions can extract full surplus, i.e., Et[maxi ti]. Throughout this paper we require the mechanisms
to be ex post IR.
The Lookahead Auction. Ronen [15]’s lookahead auction reduces multi-bidder DSIC revenue
maximization to pricing for a single bidder, while keeping at least half of the optimal revenue.
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Definition 3 ((Dominant Strategy) Lookahead Auction). For each bid vector t, the lookahead
auction choose the highest bidder i∗, and offer an optimal take-it-or-leave-it price conditioning on
(i) t−i∗ and (ii) ti∗ being the highest type.
Theorem 2 (Ronen2001). The dominant strategy lookahead auction is DSIC and ex post IR, and
extracts at least half of the revenue of the optimal DSIC, ex post IR auction.
We explicitly designate Ronen’s auction as dominant strategy lookahead, since there is a natural
extension of it for BIC auctions, which we call the Bayesian lookahead auction. However, we are
not able to show general revenue guarantee for it. (See Section 5 for a discussion.)
Lagrangian Relaxations. Proving revenue approximation results via partial Lagrangians was
promoted by Cai et al. [2]. We review the basic idea here. Consider any constrained optimization
problem:
maximize: f(x)
subject to: gα(x) ≥ 0, ∀α ∈ A
x ∈ C
(1)
Let µ be any nonnegative measure on A. The Lagrangian of (1) is L(x, λ) := f(x)+
∫
A
gα(x)λ(α)dµ(α),
where λ ∈ RA are called the Lagrange multipliers, or the dual variables. The following fact is im-
mediate.
Fact 1. Let C′ be C ∩ {x | gα(x) ≥ 0,∀α ∈ A} and assume C
′ 6= ∅. Then for any λ ≥ 0, the optimal
value of (1) is bounded above by supx∈C′ L(x, λ).
Lagrangifying only some constraints (here gα(x) ≥ 0) while leaving others as is (here x ∈
C) proves often convenient for L to be used as a benchmark to be approximated. In revenue
maximization, often the IC and IR constraints are Lagrangified, while the feasibility constraints
are left aside.
Equal Revenue Distributions Our large gap examples make use of the so-called (truncated)
equal revenue distribution, which is the most commonly used distribution with unbounded gap
between the surplus E[v] and the optimal revenue with pricing.
Definition 4 (Equal Revenue Distribution). An equal revenue distribution truncated at h is sup-
ported on [1, h], with cumulative density function
F (v) =
{
1− 1
v
, for v ∈ [1, h);
1, if v = h.
It is easy to verify that E[v] ≈ log h, whereas any posted price extracts revenue of only 1. Note
that the equal revenue distribution is regular.
3 Single-Buyer Pricing with Signals
In this section we consider the problem of single-buyer single-item pricing with signals, and show
our first main result:
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Theorem 3. In the single-buyer pricing problem with signals, suppose the distribution is jointly
regular and there is no negative payment, then the revenue achievable by a mechanism with private
signals is bounded by 3 times the revenue extractable by na¨ıve pricing, or mechanisms with public
signals. Moreover, if the distribution is a mixture of k jointly regular distributions, the gap between
the two is bounded by 3k.
Before we give the proof in Section 3.2, it is instructive to see two examples, given in Section 3.1,
which demonstrate that both conditions required by the theorem (nonnegative payment and joint
regularity) are necessary for the gap between private and public signal revenues to be finitely
bounded.
3.1 Examples with Unbounded Value of Private Signals
Our first example demonstrates that negative payments can drastically amplify the power of the
private signals.
Example 1. Let the buyer’s value v be drawn from an equal revenue distribution truncated at H
(see Definition 4). For ǫ > 0, let the signal s be equal to v with probability ǫ, and s = ∗ otherwise.
Note that the distribution in this example is jointly regular. By the property of equal revenue
distribution, with public signals, the revenue is at most 1 + ǫ lnH. The next theorem shows
that, with private signals, the seller can get revenue Ω((1 − ǫ) ln lnH); when ǫ approaches 0 (i.e.,
the “informative” signals vanish), the latter is arbitrarily more in comparison. The mechanism
extracting this revenue is nontrivial, a remarkable feature of it being that the “informative” signals
are not used to extract revenue directly but to entice the buyer into truth-telling: a payment is
made to the buyer if the reported value agrees with s.
Theorem 4. The optimal revenue with private signals is Ω((1 − ǫ) ln lnH).
Proof. We first describe the mechanism. Recall that we use x and p to denote allocation and
payment rules. Let x(v, ∗) be ln vlnH , and p(v, ∗) = vx(v, ∗) =
v ln v
lnH . Note that, when telling the
truth, the buyer realizes zero utility under the uninformative signal s = ∗. All incentives for
telling the truth comes from when s is informative and is equal to some value w: whenever the
reported v 6= w, both x(v,w) and p(v,w) are 0; otherwise, the buyer gets paid by the seller; that
is, p(v, v) is negative. The p(v, v)’s are carefully chosen to satisfy the IC constraints: let g(z) be
maxy
ln y
lnH (z − y); pv,v is then set to be −
f(v,∗)
f(v,v)g(v), where f is the density function of the equal
revenue distribution.
We relegate the proofs of the following two claims to Appendix A.
Claim 1. The mechanism defined above is IC and ex post IR.
Claim 2. For all z ≥ 1, g(z) ≤ z ln zlnH . If z ≥ e, g(z) ≤
ln z−ln ln z+1
lnH · z.
We now calculate the expected revenue of the mechanism. The key is to show that the payment
lost to the buyer under informative signals is offset far more by the revenue gained under the
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uninformative signal s = ∗:
Rev =
∫ H
1
f(v, ∗)p(v, ∗) dv +
∫ H
1
f(v, v)p(v, v) dv
=
∫ H
1
f(v, ∗)(p(v, ∗) − g(v)) ≥
∫ H
e
f(v, ∗)
(
ln v
lnH
· v −
ln v − ln ln v + 1
lnH
· v
)
dv
≥(1− ǫ)
∫ H
e
1
v
·
ln ln v − 1
lnH
dv
=(1− ǫ) ·
1
lnH
· (ln v ln ln v − 2 ln v)
∣∣∣∣
H
e
≥ (1− ǫ) · (ln lnH − 2),
where the first inequality follows from Claim 2.
Our second example shows that, in a mechanism that does not make negative payments, private
signals can still blow up the revenue by an arbitrarily large factor if the supports of the value
distributions under different signals are allowed to interleave in arbitrary ways, a situation that
would be precluded by joint regularity.
Example 2. Fix a large integer h. Signal s is uniformly distributed on {0, 1}h. Conditioning
on a realization of s, let the support of values, Ts, be {3k + sk : k = 1, 2, · · · , h}, and the value
conditioning on s is drawn from the discrete equal revenue distribution supported on Ts, i.e.,
Pr [v = ti|s] = f(ti|s) :=
{
1
ti
− 1
ti+1
, i < k
1
tk
, i = k,
where t1 < t2 < . . . < th are the elements of Ts. f(v|s) is 0 for v /∈ Ts.
The optimal revenue under public signals is easily seen to be 1. Under private signals, we argue
that the following mechanism is IC and extracts a revenue of Ω(lnh): Let x(v, s) be 1 if f(v|s) > 0,
and 0 otherwise; let p(v, s) be 13v if f(v|s) > 0, and 0 otherwise.
For any value v that the buyer has, telling the truth gets her utility Es[x(v, s) ·v−p(v, s)] =
2
3v.
By reporting any other value, the probability that her report would agree with the corresponding
coordinate of s is only 12 , which means the probability she wins the item would be at most
1
2 , and
her utility under deviation cannot be more than 12v. This shows that the mechanism is IC. Its
revenue is clearly a third of the buyer’s expected value, which is Ω(lnh).
Remark 1. In Example 2, the distribution is not jointly regular, despite its conditional value
distribution resembling discretized equal revenue distributions. Once one tries to “pad” the gaps in
the supports to make the density nonzero everywhere, the power of the private signals disappears.
This remark is not meant to contrast discrete and continuous distributions; the point is that certain
operations that are taken for granted in the absence of signals cannot be performed in correlated
settings, due to the interaction among different signals.
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3.2 Proof of Theorem 3: Bounded Power of Private Signals under Regualrity
and Non-negative Payments
We now prove Theorem 3. The optimal revenue by a mechanism with private signal and nonnegative
payments is returned by the following optimzation problem:
max :
∫
s
∫
t
f(t, s)p(t, s) dt ds
subject to:
∫
s
f(t, s)(t · x(t, s)− p(t, s)) ds ≥
∫
s
f(t, s)(t · x(t′, s)− p(t′, s)) ds ∀t, t′ · · ·λ(t, t′)
t · x(t, s)− p(t, s) ≥ 0 ∀t, s · · · µ(t, s)
p(t, s) ≥ 0 ∀t, s
(2)
We will use Rev(x, p) to denote the objective value of (2) with allocation rule x and payment rule
p and F to denote the set of feasible (x, p) pair. Then the value of (2) is sup(x,p)∈F Rev(x, p).
To prove Theorem 3, we will attempt to bound a partial Lagrangian relaxation of (2). To that
end, let L(x, p, λ, µ) be the Lagrangian relaxation defined as follows.
L(x, p, λ, µ) :=
∫
s
∫
t
f(t, s)p(t, s) dt ds
+
∫
t
∫
t′
λ(t, t′)
(∫
s
f(t, s)
(
t · (x(t, s)− x(t′, s))− (p(t, s)− p(t′, s))
)
ds
)
dt′ dt
+
∫
s
∫
t
µ(t, s)f(t, s)(t · x(t, s)− p(t, s)) dt ds.
(3)
Without loss of generality, we will assume x(t, s) = p(t, s) = 0 whenever f(t, s) = 0 as the partial
Lagrangian remains unchanged. Apply Fact 1, we easily see:
Lemma 5. sup(x,p)∈F Rev(x, p) ≤ infλ,µ≥0 sup(x,p)∈F L(x, p, λ, µ).
Using Fubini and some rearrangement of (3) gives that, whenever (x, p) is feasible,
L(x, p, λ, µ) =
∫
s
∫
t
p(t, s)
(
f(t, s)−
∫
t′
f(t, s)λ(t, t′)dt′ +
∫
t′
f(t′, s)λ(t′, t)dt′ − f(t, s)µ(t, s)
)
dt ds
+
∫
s
∫
t
x(t, s)
(
tf(t, s)µ(t, s) +
∫
t′
tf(t, s)λ(t, t′) dt′ −
∫
t′
t′f(t′, s)λ(t′, t) dt′
)
dt ds.
Define
λ∗(t, t′) =
{
2
t
, t > 0, t′ ≤ t
0, otherwise.
Define
g(t, s) := f(t, s)−
∫
t′
f(t, s)λ∗(t, t′) dt′ +
∫
t′
f(t′, s)λ∗(t′, t) dt,
and let µ∗(t, s) be such that f(t, s)µ∗(t, s) = [g(t, s)]+, where [y]+ denotes max{0, y}. Then by the
constraint p(t, s) ≥ 0 for all t, s, we have∫
t
p(t, s)
(
f(t, s)−
∫
t′
f(t, s)λ(t, t′)dt′ +
∫
t′
f(t′, s)λ(t′, t)dt′ − f(t, s)µ∗(t, s)
)
dt ≤ 0.
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Define
h(t, s) :=
∫
t′
tf(t, s)λ∗(t, t′) dt′ −
∫
t′
t′f(t′, s)λ∗(t′, t) dt′.
We can then bound L(x, p, λ∗, µ∗) by
L(x, p, λ∗, µ∗) ≤
∫
s
∫
t
x(t, s)
(
tf(t, s)µ∗(t, s) +
∫
t′
tf(t, s)λ∗(t, t′) dt′ −
∫
t′
t′f(t′, s)λ∗(t′, t) dt′
)
dt ds
=
∫
s
∫
t
x(t, s) ([tg(t, s)]+ + h(t, s)) dt ds.
Appendix B contains the proof of the following lemma and other missing proofs of this section:
Lemma 6. The revenue of any mechanism with private signals and nonnegative prices is upper
bounded by ∫
s
∫
t
([
tg(t, s) +
1
2
h(t, s)
]
+
+ [h(t, s)]+
)
dt ds. (4)
Our choice of λ is independent of the signal and so we bound the inner integral of (4) for each s.
Let DRev(s) denote the contribution to the optimal revenue under public signals under signal s.
The following lemma is the only place where we need the regularity assumption:
Lemma 7. If the distribution is jointly regular, then for all signals s,∫
t
[h(t, s)]+ dt ≤ 2 · DRev(s),∫
t
[
t · g(t, s) +
1
2
h(t, s)
]
+
dt ≤ DRev(s).
Proof. By definition, we have that t · g(t, s) = 2
∫
t′≥t
tf(t′,s)
t′
dt′ − tf(t, s) and
h(t, s) = 2tf(t, s)− 2
∫
t′≥t
f(t′, s) dt′ = 2f(s) [tf(t|s)− 2[1− F (t|s)] = 2f(s, t)ϕ(t|s).
where f(s) :=
∫
t′
f(t′, s)dt′ is the marginal density of s, and f(t|s), F (t|s) and ϕ(t|s) are the condi-
tional density, conditional cumulative density and conditional virtual value of t given s, respectively.
By Myerson’s lemma (Lemma 1),
∫
t
[h(t, s)]+ dt is bounded by 2DRev(s).
For the second part of the statement, we have∫
t
[
t · g(t, s) +
1
2
h(t, s),
]
+
dt =
∫
t
t ·
[
2
∫
t′≥t
f(t′, s)
t′
dt′ −
∫
t′≥t
f(t′, s)
t
dt′
]
+
dt.
We first show that there exists 0 ≤ l ≤ u such that the integrand is positive only on an interval
[l, u]. Let ψs(t) be 2
∫
t′≥t
f(t′,s)
t′
dt′ −
∫
t′≥t
f(t′,s)
t
dt′. Then
dψs
dt
(t) =− 2
f(t, s)
t
+
∫
t′≥t
f(t′, s)
t2
dt′ +
f(t, s)
t
=−
f(t, s)
t2
(
t−
1− F (t|s)
f(t|s)
)
=−
f(t, s)
t2
ϕ(t|s).
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By joint regularity, ϕ(t|s) is nondecreasing so ψs(t) has at most two roots. In particular, there
exists 0 ≤ l ≤ u such that ψs(t) ≥ 0 if and only if l ≤ t ≤ u. For any r ∈ R≥0 we have∫
t≤r
t · ψs(t) dt =
∫
t≤r
2
∫
t′≥t
tf(t′, s)
t′
dt′ dt−
∫
t≤r
∫
t′≥t
f(t′, s) dt′ dt
=
∫
t′
∫
t≤min{r,t′}
2tf(t′, s)
t′
dt dt′ −
∫
t′
∫
t≤min{r,t}
f(t′, s) dt dt′
=
∫
t′≤r
(∫
t≤t′
2tf(t′, s)
t′
dt− t′f(t′, s)
)
dt′ +
∫
t′>r
(∫
t≤r
2tf(t′, s)
t′
dt− rf(t′, s)
)
dt′
=
∫
t′>r
(
r2
t′
− r
)
f(t′, s) dt′ ≤ 0.
On the other hand, for any r ∈ R≥0,
−
∫
t≤r
t · ψs(t) dt = −
∫
t′>r
(
r2
t′
− r
)
f(t′, s) dt′ ≤ r
∫
t′≥r
f(t′, s) dt′ ≤ DRev(s).
Thus,
∫
t
[t · g(t, s) + 12h(t, s)]+ dt =
∫
l≤t≤u t · ψs(t) dt =
∫
t≤u t · ψs(t) dt −
∫
t≤l t · ψs(t) dt ≤
DRev(s).
Putting together what we have showed: by Lemma 6, the revenue of any mechanism with
private signal and nonnegative payments is bounded above by (4). Assuming joint regularity and
applying Lemma 7, we have that the inner integral of (4) is bounded above by 3DRev(s). Hence,
the revenue of any BSIC mechanism is bounded above by 3
∫
s
DRev(s) ds = 3DRev.
When the distribution is a mixture of k jointly regular distributions, all arguments remain true
except that the bounds in Lemma 7 degrade by a factor of k. We relegate the details to Appendix B.
4 Multi-bidder Auctions
In this section we consider the revenues of DSIC and BIC multi-bidder auctions with correlated
values. Our examples in Section 3.1 can be easily translated to multi-bidder distributions, showing:
Corollary 1. In multi-bidder auctions with correlated values, if the auctioneer is allowed to make
payments to the bidders, or if the value distribution is not jointly regular, the revenue of the optimal
BIC mechanism can be more than that of any DSIC mechanism by an arbitrarily large factor.
For completeness, we give a proof for the corollary in Appendix C. The main result of this
section is that the bound we gave in Theorem 3 for the single-buyer problem can be extended to
multi-bidder auctions, with the loss of another constant factor. It is tempting to use Ronen [15]’s
lookahead auction (see Definition 3) which reduces the multi-bidder problem to extracting revenue
from the highest bidder. However, Ronen’s proof does not directly apply to BIC mechanisms
due to subtle reasons we discuss in Section 5. Instead, we are able to carry on a “lookahead
type of argument” in the partial Lagrangian under no negative payment and regularity: almost
coincidentally, the dual variables we constructed in the proof of Theorem 3 have a property needed
for such an argument (Claim 3).
Theorem 8. In a multi-bidder auction with jointly regular distribution, the revenue of the lookahead
auction is at least 15 that of the optimal BIC mechanism not using negative payments. Furthermore,
if the the distribution is a mixture of k jointly regular distributions, the bound is 13k+2 .
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Proof. Following an approach similar to Section 3.2, we show the following lemma, whose proof
and other missing proofs from this section can be found in Appendix C.
Lemma 9. The revenue of the optimal BIC, ex post IR mechanism is at most
max
x≥0
∫
t
f(t)
∑
i
xi(t) {[gi(t)ti]+ + hi(t)} dt,
s.t.
∑
i
xi(t) ≤ 1, ∀t,
where
gi(t) = −f(t) + 2
∫
t′
i
>ti
f(t′i, t−i)
t′i
dt′i,
hi(t) = 2f(t−i) [tif(ti|t−i)− (1− F (ti|t−i)] .
Claim 3. For any t and i, [gi(t)ti]+ + hi(t) ≤ 2tif(t).
Let Ui ⊆ T denote the set of type profiles in which bidder i is considered the potential winner
by the lookahead auction. Recall that t ∈ Ui implies that ti is a highest type in t. Let secmax(t)
denote the second highest type in vector t. We further partition L(µ∗, λ∗):
L(µ∗, λ∗) ≤ max
x≥0
∑
i
{∫
t∈Ui
∑
i′
xi′(t)([ti′gi′(t)]+ + hi′(t)) dt
}
≤ max
x≥0
∑
i


∫
t∈Ui
∑
i′ 6=i
xi′(t)([ti′gi′(t)]+ + hi′(t)) dt+
∫
t∈Ui
xi(t)([tigi(t)]+ + hi(t)) dt


≤
∑
i
∫
t∈Ui
2 secmax(t)f(t) dt+
∑
i
∫
t∈Ui
xi(t)([gi(t)]+ + hi(t)) dt
= 2
∫
t
secmax(t)f(t) dt+
∑
i
∫
t∈Ui
xi(t)([gi(t)]+ + hi(t)) dt (5)
s.t. 0 ≤ xi(t) ≤ 1, ∀t ∈ Ui.
where the inequality follows from Claim 3,
∑
i′ 6=i xi′ ≤ 1 and ti′ ≤ secmax(t) for any t ∈ Ui. The
first term of (5) is twice the revenue of the second price auction. With slight modification of the
argument in the proof of Theorem 3 (see Lemma 10 in Appendix C), one can show that the second
term of (5) is upper bounded by 3k times the revenue of the lookahead auction when the distribution
is a mixture of k jointly regular distributions. This completes the proof of Theorem 8.
5 Conclusions and Discussion
In this work we give a fairly complete characterization, up to constant multiplicative factors, of
revenue differences between disclosed and private side information when pricing for a single buyer,
and of revenues differences between DSIC and BIC auctions for multiple bidders with correlated
values. We find that regularity in the value distribution and the absence of negative payments are
necessary and sufficient for these differences to be relatively small.
In connecting the results for these two settings, we used an argument that is reminiscent of
Ronen [15]’s proof for his lookahead auction (Definition 3). However, our proof relies on the two
11
mentioned conditions and our particular choice of dual variables. Ronen’s original proof cannot be
straightforwardly carried over for BIC auctions, and we briefly explain the reason here.
One property trivially true for DSIC auctions is convenient for showing the approximate opti-
mality of the lookahead auction: given an optimal DSIC auction, if one were to zero out all the
allocations and payments for all bidders except for the highest, the remaining auction is still DSIC.
This is not true for BIC auctions. A bidder holding a certain value is sometimes the highest bidder,
and sometimes not; her expected utility is affected by her allocations and payments when her value
is not the highest. Removing these allocations and payments may invalidate the IC constraints.
Therefore, by restricting an auction to only allocating to the highest bidders, it is unclear whether
it is able to extract as much revenue as an unrestricted auction from the highest bidders. 2
We therefore leave open the following interesting question: for multiple bidders with correlated
values, can a BIC auction that allocates only to the highest bidders extract a constant fraction of
the optimal BIC auction’s revenue?
A Proofs from Section 3.1
Proof of Claim 1. Showing ex post IR is straightforward: for the informative signals, it is easy to
see p(v,w) ≤ 0 ≤ x(v,w) · v for all v,w; for s = ∗, p(v, ∗) equals x(v, ∗) · v by definition. We now
show that mechanism is also IC. By reporting her true value, a buyer with value v has expected
utility
1
f(v, ∗) + f(v, v)
(
f(v, ∗) · 0− f(v, v) · p(v, v)
)
=
f(v, ∗)
f(v, ∗) + f(v, v)
· g(v).
By telling her value as w, the buyer would have expected utility
1
f(v, ∗) + f(v, v)
(
f(v, ∗) · (v · x(v, ∗) − p(v, ∗)) + f(v, v) · 0
)
=
f(v, ∗)
f(v, ∗) + f(v, v)
·
lnw
lnH
(v − w)
≤
f(v, ∗)
f(v, ∗) + f(v, v)
· g(v),
where the inequality holds by the definition of g(z).
Proof of Claim 2. Let h(y) = ln y · (z − y). Observe that when y > z, h(y) < 0 ≤ z ln z and
when y ≤ z, h(y) ≤ z ln z, the first part of the claim is trivial. Now suppose z ≥ e. Then
h′(y) = 1
y
(z − y) − ln y. Hence the maximum of g(z) is achieved when y(ln y + 1) = z. This
implies ln y ≤ ln z − ln ln z + 1, otherwise y(ln y + 1) > ezln z (ln z − ln ln z + 2) ≥ z. Therefore,
g(z) = ln ylnH (z − y) ≤
ln z−ln ln z+1
lnH · z when z ≥ e.
B Proofs from Section 3.2
Proof of Lemma 6. The optimal revenue is bounded above by
sup
(x,p)∈F
L(x, p, λ∗, µ∗) ≤ sup
(x,p)∈F
∫
s
∫
t
x(t, s) ([tg(t, s)]+ + h(t, s)) dt ds
=
∫
s
∫
t
[[tg(t, s)]+ + h(t, s)]+ dt ds.
2This also calls to mind the comparison between β-exclusive and β-adjusted revenues considered by Yao [19] for
multi-item auctions with bidders with additive values. It is also unclear whether Yao’s argument can be applied here.
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Let T+ denote {(t, s) : g(t, s) ≥ 0} and let 1T+ be its indicator function, then∫
s
∫
t
[[tg(t, s)]+ + h(t, s)]+ dt ds
=
∫
s
∫
t
[tg(t, s) + h(t, s)]+1T+dt ds+
∫
s
∫
t
[h(t, s)]+1T+dt ds
≤
∫
s
∫
t
[
tg(t, s) +
1
2
h(t, s)
]
+
1T+ dt ds+
1
2
∫
s
∫
t
[h(t, s)]+1T+ dt ds+
∫
s
∫
t
[h(t, s)]+1T+ dt ds
≤
∫
s
∫
t
([
tg(t, s) +
1
2
h(t, s)
]
+
+ [h(t, s)]+
)
dt ds.
Proof for Mixture of k joingly regular distributions. Adapting the same flow variables λ(·, ·) as the
proof for Theorem 3, we only need to prove the following variation of Lemma 7: if f(·, s) is a
mixture of k regular distributions, that is, f(t, s) =
∑k
i=1 αifi(t, s), where each fi is the density of
a jointly regular distribution, and
∑
i αi = 1, with αi ≥ 0,∀i, then∫
t
[h(t, s)]+ dt ≤ 2k ·DRev(s),∫
t
[
t · g(t, s) +
1
2
h(t, s)
]
+
dt ≤ k · DRev(s).
As before, we have
h(t, s) = 2tf(t, s)− 2
∫
t′≥t
f(t′, s) dt′,∫
t
[
t · g(t, s) +
1
2
h(t, s),
]
+
dt =
∫
t
t ·
[
2
∫
t′≥t
f(t′, s)
t′
dt′ −
∫
t′≥t
f(t′, s)
t
dt′
]
+
dt.
Using the fact that [x+ y]+ ≤ [x]+ + [y]+, we have∫
t
[h(t, s)]+ dt ≤
∑
i∈[k]
2αi
∫
t
f(t, s)[ϕis(t)]+ dt,
∫
t
[
t · g(t, s) +
1
2
h(t, s),
]
+
dt ≤
∑
i∈[k]
αi
∫
t
t ·
[
2
∫
t′≥t
fi(t
′, s)
t′
dt′ −
∫
t′≥t
fi(t
′, s)
t
dt′
]
+
dt,
where ϕis denotes the conditional virtual value of the i-th regular distribution given signal s. Now
apply the argument in Section 3.2 to get ∫
t
f(t, s)[ϕis(t)]+ dt ≤ 2DRevi(s),∫
t
t ·
[
2
∫
t′≥t
fi(t
′, s)
t′
dt′ −
∫
t′≥t
fi(t
′, s)
t
dt′
]
+
dt ≤ DRevi(s),
where DRevi(s) denotes the part of the optimal DSIC revenue for distribution fi(·, s) from signal s.
Observe that αiDRevi(s) ≤ DRev(s) for all i, we conclude the proof.
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C Proofs from Section 4
Proof of Corollary 1. Take either example from Section 3.1, we construct a two-bidder auction
where the revenue of the optimal BIC mechanism is at least the revenue in the example under
private signals, and revenue of the optimal DSIC mechanism is arbitrarily close to the optimal
revenue under disclosed signals. In both examples, the signal space S is finite, and we can number
the signals by integers so that S = {1, 2, · · · , |S|}. For every (v, s) in the single-buyer example,
let bidder 1’s value be v, and bidder 2’s value be s · ǫ/|S| for an arbitrarily small ǫ > 0. Take
any single-buyer selling mechanism with private signals, use its allocation and payment rules for
bidder 1 while taking bidder 2’s value as the signal (while never allocating or charging anything to
bidder 2), then the resulting auction is BIC and extracts the same revenue as in the single-buyer
example. On the other hand, if pricing under disclosed signals extracts at most revenue R from
the single buyer, then any DSIC auction for the two-bidder setting can extract at most R from
bidder 1, and at most ǫ from bidder 2 (because of individual rationality). The corollary follows by
taking ǫ sufficiently small.
Proof of Lemma 9. We consider the linear program that returns the revenue of the optimal BIC
multi-bidder auction without negative payments.
max
x,p
∫
t
f(t)
∑
i
pi(t) dt
s.t.
∫
t−i
f(ti, t−i)[ti · xi(ti, t−i)− pi(ti, t−i)] dt−i ≥
∫
t−i
f(ti, t−i)[ti · xi(t
′
i, t−i)− pi(t
′
i, t−i)] dt−i ∀i, ti, t
′
i
ti · xi(t)− pi(t) ≥ 0, ∀i, t
pi(t) ≥ 0, ∀i, t∑
i
xi(t) ≤ 1, ∀t
xi(t) ≥ 0, ∀i, t
This revenue is upper bounded by the following partial Lagrangian, for any µ, λ ≥ 0:
L(µ, λ) :=max
x,p
∫
t
f(t)
∑
i
pi(t) dt+
∫
t
∑
i
µi(t)[ti · xi(t)− pi(t)] dt
+
∑
i
∫
ti
∫
t′
i
λi(ti, t
′
i)
{∫
t−i
f(ti, t−i)[ti · xi(ti, t−i)− pi(ti, t−i)− ti · xi(t
′
i, t−i) + pi(t
′
i, t−i)]dt−i
}
dtidt
′
i
=max
x,p
∑
i
∫
t
pi(t)
{
f(t)− µi(t) +
∫
t′
i
[
λi(t
′
i, ti)f(t
′
i, t−i)− λi(ti, t
′
i)f(ti, t−i)
]
dt′i
}
dt
+
∑
i
∫
t
xi(t)
{
µi(t)ti +
∫
t′
i
[
ti · λi(ti, t
′
i)f(ti, t−i)− t
′
i · λi(t
′
i, ti)f(t
′
i, t−i)
]
dt′i
}
dt
s.t. pi(t) ≥ 0, ∀i, t∑
i
xi(t) ≤ 1, ∀t
xi(t) ≥ 0, ∀i, t
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Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3, we try the following dual variables:
λ∗i (ti, t
′
i) =
{ 2
ti
, t > 0, t′ ≤ t;
0, otherwise.
Again, define
gi(t) := f(t)−
∫
t′
i
f(t)λ∗i (ti, t
′
i) dt
′ +
∫
t′
i
f(t′i, t−i)λ
∗
i (t
′
i, ti) dt
′
i = −f(t) + 2
∫
t′
i
>ti
f(t′i, t−i)
t′i
dt′i,
hi(t) =
∫
t′
i
ti · λ
∗
i (ti, t
′
i)f(t) dt
′
i −
∫
t′
i
t′i · λ
∗
i (t
′
i, ti)f(t
′
i, t−i) dt
′
i = 2f(t−i) [tif(ti|t−i)− (1− F (ti|t−i)] .
Let µi(t) be [gi(t)]+. Then
L(µ∗, λ∗) ≤max
x≥0
∫
t
f(t)
∑
i
xi(t) {[gi(t)ti]+ + hi(t)} dt,
s.t.
∑
i
xi(t) ≤ 1, ∀t.
Proof of Claim 3. The claim is easily seen by a case analysis. For gi(t) ≤ 0, [gi(t)ti]+ + hi(t) =
hi(t) ≤ 2f(t)ti, as 1− F (ti|t−i) ≥ 0. For gi(t) ≥ 0, we have
[gi(t)ti]+ + hi(t) = tif(t) + 2
[∫
t′
i
>ti
tif(t
′
i, t−i)
t′i
dt′i −
∫
t′
i
>ti
t′if(t
′
i, t−i)
t′i
dt′i
]
≤ tif(t).
Lemma 10. Let Revi be the revenue extracted from bidder i by the lookahead auction, then
max
0≤xi(t)≤1
xi(t)
∫
t∈Ui
([tigi(t)]+ + hi(t)) dt,
is bounded by 3Revi, where gi and hi are defined as in (5),
Proof. By the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 6, we have
max
0≤xi(t)≤1
xi(t)
∫
t∈Ui
([tigi(t)]+ + hi(t)) dt ≤
∫
t∈Ui
[tigi(t) +
1
2
hi(t)]+ + [hi(t)]+ dt.
By the same calculation as in the proof of Lemma 7, hi(t) is 2f(t)ϕi(ti|t−i), where ϕi(ti|t−i) is the
virtual value of ti in the distribution conditioning on t−i. By joint regularity, D(ti|t−i) is regular,
and so D(ti|t−i, ti > maxi′ 6=i ti′) is also regular. Therefore∫
t∈Ui
[hi(t)]+ dt = 2Revi .
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As for the term [tigi(t) +
1
2hi(t)]+, from the calculation in Lemma 7, we know that, fixing any
t−i, tigi(t) is nonnegative only on an interval [l, u], and∫
ti≤u:(ti,t−i)∈Ui
(
tigi(t) +
1
2
hi(t)
)
dti ≤ 0,
−
∫
ti≤l:(ti,t−i)∈Ui
(
tigi(t) +
1
2
hi(t)
)
dti ≤ l
∫
ti≥l:(ti,t−i)∈Ui
f(ti, t−i) dti
≤ max(l,max
i′ 6=i
ti′)
∫
ti≥l:(ti,t−i)∈Ui
f(ti, t−i) dti, (6)
where the RHS of (6) is upper bounded by the revenue of the lookahead auction when the bidders
other than i bid t−i. Therefore,∫
t∈Ui
[tigi(t) +
1
2
hi(t)]+ dt ≤ Revi .
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